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Long-term supply contracts often have ambiguous effects on the competitive structure, investment and
consumer welfare in the long term. In the new market context, these effects are likely to be worsened
and thus even harder to assess. Since liberalization and especially since the release of the Energy Sector
Inquiry in early 2007, the portfolio of long-term supply contracts of the former incumbents have
become a priority for review by the European Commission and the national competition authorities. It is
widely believed that European Competition authorities take a dogmatic view on these contracts and
systemically emphasize the risk of foreclosure over their positive effects on investment and operation.
This paper depicts the methodology that has emerged in the recent line of cases and argues that this
interpretation is largely misguided. It shows that a multiple-step approach is used to reduce regulation
costs and balance anti-competitive effects with potential efﬁciency gains. However, if an economic
approach is now clearly implemented, competition policy is constrained by the procedural aspect of the
legal process and the remedies imposed remain open for discussion.
& 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Long-term supply contracts (LTC) remain a pervasive feature of
most European energy markets despite the progress of liberal-
ization (DG COMP, 2007). To get out of the monopoly era, the
current reﬁning and harmonization of European market designs
may be pointless if incumbents continue to use these contracts as
devices to control market (Glachant and Leveˆque, 2009; Neumann
and von Hirschhausen, 2006). These contracts indeed frequently
have anti-competitive foreclosure effects when competition is
imperfect (Fumagalli and Motta, 2006; Rasmusen et al., 1991;
Segal and Whinston, 2000) and these effects are likely to be
worsened in the new market context. However, there is growing
acceptance that their positive impact on investment makes them
desirable as long as spot market competition remains unsatisfac-
tory (Chao et al., 2008; Finon and Roques, 2008). Welfare-
enhancing aspects must thus be weighed against possible side
effects on the current efforts of the European Union (EU) to create
truly competitive markets.
Today, the allocation of regulatory powers in the EU is biased in
favor of the ex post enforcement of EC antitrust law. The
institutional structure of the European Union does not give to
the European Commission the power to alter property rights inll rights reserved.
33140916427.
.d. Hauteclocque).
A.de, Glachant, J.-M., Long
.1016/j.enpol.2009.07.054the different member states and thus to carry an aggressive policy
of horizontal de-integration which would probably deliver better
and faster results (Green and Newbery, 1997; Newbery et al.,
2003). In addition, the lack of an EU-wide energy regulator with
effective power to monitor and regulate market developments,
especially cross-border trade issues, is particularly detrimental to
the integration and the well-functioning of European energy
markets (Glachant and Leveˆque, 2009). While sector-speciﬁc
regulation shows obvious signs of weakness, the European
Commission has announced it would use its antitrust power with
even more strength in the coming years (DG COMP 2007; Monti,
2003).
Conducting market building through antitrust does not go
without uncertainties about the suitability of the policy tool itself
and about the ability of the judges to enforce it. Antitrust policy
remains constrained by the legal process, and especially judicial
review. This also raises questions both about the discretion which
a process of market building requires to be conducted efﬁciently
and about the time and cost of dispute resolution through court
trial (Newbery, 2006). In addition, the antitrust laws are usually
enforced in sectors where competition is more mature and a
limited knowledge of competition dynamics may result in
signiﬁcant error costs (Smeers, 2009).
Following a worldwide trend in global antitrust (Van den
Bergh, 2002), the on-going modernization of EC antitrust policy
aims at implementing a ‘more economic’ approach based on
long-term consumer welfare. It means gradually shifting from a-term energy supply contracts in European competition policy:
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approach where the real economic effects of competitive
behaviors are more important than the drafting of contracts
(Ehlermann, 2000; Gual et al., 2005; Verouden, 2003; Wesseling,
2000). The ‘more economic’ approach might signiﬁcantly impact
the way the EC antitrust laws are enforced, which brings new
uncertainties both for the regulator and the regulated ﬁrms.
If EC antitrust policy becomes one of the main energy policy
tool at the EU level to open markets, it is worth analyzing the
forces which shape its implementation. The case of LTC is
particularly interesting as they have become one of the main
priorities for antitrust enforcement (DG COMP, 2007). A series of
cases has already been published and new ones are regularly
opened, for instance lately against EDF and Electrabel. A wide-
spread view, both in academia and in the industry, is that the
European Commission is taking a dogmatic view on LTC and
would simply consider them unacceptable when implemented by
dominant companies. This can be understood as DG Competition
since the early 2000s has publicly and repeatedly voiced strong
concerns over the risks of anti-competitive effects inherent in
energy LTC (Albers, 2001–2002; DG COMP, 2007). However, a
more economic approach in antitrust could not reject outright LTC
in energy and should command a more balanced approach.
The objective of this paper is two-fold. The ﬁrst one is to depict
the pros and cons of LTC in energy, from the usual IO and NIE
perspectives (e.g. Neuhoff and von Hirschhausen, 2006), which
are the perspectives of individual contracting parties, as well as
from a general antitrust point of view. The second one is to
analyze the actual behavior of the European Commission vis-a-vis
these contracts and the methodology it is implementing to
analyze foreclosure in the existing context.
The paper will be divided as follows. Section 2 will present
what economics has to say on the current EU antitrust dilemma
with LTC in energy and what are its limitations. Section 3 will
depict the two-step methodology that is emerging at the
European Commission to analyze the anti-competitive effects of
energy LTC. Section 4 will then turn to the difﬁculties which the
European Commission has to balance the anti-competitive effects
and the potential efﬁciency gains. It will also analyze the remedies
imposed to correct the anti-competitive features of European
energy markets and the ‘pro-entry’ bias that can be depicted.
Concluding remarks will follow.2. The EU actual antitrust dilemma with LTC in energy:
foreclosure vs. transaction costs
In essence, antitrust policy is about maximizing long term
social welfare, with a general bias in favor of consumer welfare in
the EU. This often implies constraining the freedom of some
economic agents in the short term to reach a greater social value
over several periods of times. It is typically the case with the
deregulation of energy markets where incumbents may have to
suffer some harm to facilitate the emergence of truly competitive
markets, deemed to increase social welfare through better
generation performance, labor productivity, service quality in
distribution and network congestion management (Newbery and
Pollitt, 1997; Markiewicz et al., 2004). The balancing between the
efﬁciency gains of long-term contracting for a few individual
market players and the potential negative effects on social welfare
are at the hearth of the antitrust dilemma with LTC in energy.
However, restricting the freedom to contract of some agents must
be based on valid economic reasoning and requires being able to
conduct some kind of inter-temporal analysis of the effects of LTC
on welfare. We present in this section a basic economic analysis ofPlease cite this article as: Hauteclocque, A.de, Glachant, J.-M., Long
Fuzzy not.... Energy Policy (2009), doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2009.07.054the pros and cons of LTC for individual market players and for the
society as a whole.2.1. LTC decrease transaction costs for contracting parties
LTC are often considered an efﬁcient substitute for vertical
integration in case merger is prohibited or considered to incur too
heavy organizational costs. The main advantage of LTC for
individual ﬁrms is to hedge price and quantity risks and therefore
facilitate investment or operation. In the old monopoly era,
vertical integration and long-term contracting were the preferred
way to structure business relationships in energy. Reliability and
investment were ensured, but at a hidden cost for society (Stern,
2004; Littlechild, 2005). In the new competitive paradigm, large
and stable spot markets are to coordinate behaviors and should be
liquid enough to enable ﬁrms to sink high ﬁxed costs investments
based on reliable investment signals. Yet, European spot markets
remain under-developed (DG COMP, 2007), demand is inelastic
and market structures are highly concentrated, hence ﬁrms tend
to resort to more durable vertical arrangements. If spot markets
are under-developed, future cash ﬂows are uncertain and the
uncertainty on the returns will lead risk-averse investors to
under-invest in generation capacities (Neuhoff and de Vries,
2004). LTC may mitigate this by providing an insurance device
which will also help secure funds with investment banks under
project ﬁnancing structures (Finon and Roques, 2008; Lacy, 2006).
However, it is not clear whether short term cash management
rationale should extend to pure long-term hedging strategies not
linked to any new investment in capacity. Indeed, long-term
hedging of a substantial part of output would severely limit proﬁt
opportunities in the case of already amortized power plants
(Parsons, 2008).
If bilateral contracting is unavoidable due to the state of spot
market development, LTC will help economize on the transaction
costs (Williamson, 1975, 1985) linked to the uncertainty of the on-
going process of liberalization and the signiﬁcant asset speciﬁcity
of investments in energy markets. In this line of reasoning, LTC are
thought to help contracting parties solve the problems of
counterparty credibility and opportunistic behavior arising when
high ﬁxed-cost investment must be sunk (Klein et al., 1978;
Williamson, 1983). The different players generally face different
price and quantity risks depending on their position on the supply
chain and the technology used. LTC may then also enable them to
allocate these risks to the party best able to manage it (Finon and
Roques, 2008; Wiser et al., 2004). The pricing scheme and
contract clauses should thus mirror the risk aversion proﬁles of
the parties and the risk premiums will depend not only on the
counterparties’ characteristics and risk aversions but also on
diverse political, regulatory and macroeconomic risks (Glachant
and Hallack, 2009). Empirical research supports the theory and
shows for instance that gas supply contracts linked to an asset-
speciﬁc investment are on average four years longer (Neumann
and von Hirschhausen, 2006; Stern, 1998). Similar relationships
between transaction costs and the length of contracts had already
been demonstrated by Joskow (1985, 1987a, 1987b) in the case of
coal contracts. In the opposite direction, as soon as asset
speciﬁcity decreases, efﬁciency gains attached to LTC tend to
decrease as well (Doane and Spulber, 1994). Parsons (1989) for
instance used an auction model to show that the strategic value of
the gas sold by different producers in Russia, Canada and Norway
through LTC diminished compared to the sale price on spot
markets when the number of wholesale buyers increased.
It is important to note that LTC are not monolithic and display
different results in terms of surplus and risk management
depending on contract characteristics and the technology in--term energy supply contracts in European competition policy:
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for instance decreases the transaction costs of renegotiation (EDF-
IDEI Report, 2007). Reduction clauses allow the buyer to reduce
off-take in case the supplier starts reselling in its commercial area,
which protects the buyer’s market and its sunk investments.
Volume clauses may include rebate mechanisms which may
reduce the price for the buyer. Exclusivity clauses also enable the
buyer to decrease transaction costs. Indeed, Crocker and Masten
(1988) and Masten and Crocker (1985) show that the take-or-pay
clauses1 may provide enough ﬂexibility to avoid breach and thus
expensive renegotiation of contract. A LTC will thus be the most
efﬁcient governance structure for contracting parties if it ensures
ﬂexibility for renegotiation and solves the counterparty credibility
problem (Borison and Hamm, 2005). In return, LTC will not be
efﬁcient for individual market players in all cases, especially if the
economic agent has a certain monopoly or monopsony power and
could manipulate spot prices.
2.2. Efﬁciency for individual market players rejoins efﬁciency for the
society in some cases
Some positive effects of LTC on social welfare may thus clearly
be depicted. In the short term, LTC tend to limit double margin-
alization (Onofri, 2005). Double marginalization occurs when
several ﬁrms at different levels of the supply chain concurrently
exercise market power and LTC, as vertical integration, allows the
total single margin to be lower than the sum of the margin in the
de-integrated case. LTC may also prevent abuse of dominance on
spot markets, although this is a highly debated argument. The
strategic behavior of ﬁrms on spot and forward markets has been
the main stream of research in the economics of LTC in energy
since the seminal contribution of Allaz and Vila (1993). The policy
recommendations are not unanimous though. Due to the high
concentration levels of supply and demand and the low demand
elasticity, at least in the short term, abuses of market power on
spot markets through e.g. withholding of capacities are likely. LTC
may limit the incentives of dominant operators to abuse their
market power on the spot as increases in prices would only be
proﬁtable on the un-contracted part of their supplies, hence LTC
tend to increase traded volumes, especially when supplier
concentration is low (Bushnell, 2007; Green, 1999; Willem and
de Corte, 2008). This may however only be true if competition is
modeled a la Cournot, especially if coupled with other measures
to increase demand elasticity (Borenstein, 2002). By modeling
competition a la Bertrand, Mahenc and Salanie, (2004) indeed
show that price-setting producers with long position may sustain
high prices by buying their own production forward. From a
theoretical point of view, Bonasina et al. (2007) and Smeers
(2009) however show that the set of assumptions used in the
diverse models are too uncertain to ﬁrmly ground policy actions
and order contract or asset divestiture. From a practical point of
view, it will indeed be difﬁcult for antitrust authorities to
differentiate between the exercise of market power and legitimate
scarcity rents (Fraser, 2003). It is also likely that the standard of
proof used in courts would in any way be too high to use that
argument.
The positive effects of LTC on social welfare are much more
obvious in the longer term. First, LTC facilitate entry and thus
contribute to market building if spot prices are volatile, when they1 Take-or-pay clauses give ﬂexibility to the buyer by granting him the
possibility to nominate the quantity of energy it wishes to purchase within a
minimum and a maximum contractual threshold. If the minimum quantity
threshold is not reached, the buyer will have to pay for the shortfall at the full
contractual price. For a lengthy description of the different take-or-pay clauses, see
Coop (2006).
Please cite this article as: Hauteclocque, A.de, Glachant, J.-M., Long
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volumes (Green and Newbery, 1997; Newbery, 1998). The second
positive effect is not only that it facilitates investment and thus
contributes to long-term generation adequacy, it is also that it
may contribute to fuel mix diversity by facilitating investment in
base load technologies such as nuclear or coal (Finon and Perez,
2008). Indeed, the greater the ﬁxed costs are, the greater are price
and quantity risks (Finon and Roques, 2008; Roques et al., 2005).
Whereas large, diversiﬁed and vertically-integrated incumbents
can implement portfolio strategies and obtain a relatively greater
value from base-load technologies (Roques et al., 2006; Roques et
al., 2007), unstable spot markets constitute an especially high
barrier to entry for new players in these technologies. Roques
(2007) indeed shows that without LTC, CCGT is the preferred
technology for new entrants as it is self-hedged given the
correlation between electricity and gas prices observed in most
markets. This makes CCGT particularly attractive to new entrants,
which is conﬁrmed by Watson (2004) in its comparative study
between the CCGT and the ﬂuidised bed boiler technologies. LTC
might thus enable new entrants to invest directly in high-ﬁxed
cost technologies. This would also reduce their incentives to swap
peak against base load capacities owned by incumbents, rather
than investing, in order to reach a more balanced portfolio of
technologies. A recent example of this was the agreement
between EDF and POWEO signed in January 2007. POWEO gained
access to EDF nuclear capacities from 2007 to 2021 and will give
in return a future access to its CCGT currently in the construction
phase, for the same capacity and the same period (160MW per
year over 15 years).2.3. But LTC can trap European energy markets in a vicious circle
reinforcing the collective dominance of incumbents
LTC have both positive and negative effects from the point of
view of long-term social welfare. The main problem with LTC is
the risk of foreclosure of more efﬁcient players. This problem is
even stronger in the new market context and is the main
argument of the European Commission and national competition
authorities to attack these contracts (DG COMP, 2007). If a
signiﬁcant part of demand is tied in the long run, a lack of retail
outlets may lead to signiﬁcant output foreclosure at the produc-
tion level and tied consumers will not be able to subsequently
beneﬁt from future and potentially more proﬁtable offers by new
entrants. LTC may thus constitute a barrier to entry and have a
negative effect on third parties. Conversely, if the market structure
at the producer level is very concentrated, input foreclosure may
occur and prevent entry in retail. For the Chicago School, an
inefﬁcient attempt to monopolize the market is impossible as it
would require the acceptation of the buyer to incur the loss of not
dealing with a more efﬁcient entrant (Bork, 1993; Posner, 1976).
This holds only under perfect information and if all possible
parties are able to negotiate at the contracting stage. Under
perfect information about the likelihood of entry of a more
efﬁcient supplier, economic theory shows that the current
supplier is able to propose a contract with both a price and a
penalty for default clause strictly advantageous for him but
neutral or positive for the buyer. Rent would thus jointly be
extracted by the incumbent and the buyer from the potential
entrant but this would not impact social welfare. Therefore, under
complete information, LTC could not be motivated by anti-
competitive motives and would never be detrimental to welfare.
An alternative explanation introduces buyer-to-buyer external-
ities while keeping the rationality hypothesis of the Chicago
school. A buyer might agree to sign an inefﬁcient LTC in order to
reduce the size of a potential entrant’s market, thereby reducing-term energy supply contracts in European competition policy:
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accept a higher price in the next period (Aghion and Bolton, 1987),
which will give a competitive hedge to the ﬁrst buyer. While it is
rational to sign a LTC for a buyer in that case, buyer-to-buyer
externalities render it negative for social welfare. Rasmusen et al.
(1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) introduce scale economies
in production and multiple buyers to show that if an incumbent is
able to secure a proﬁt superior to the amount required to
compensate the buyer from being tied, he will use LTC to fully
foreclose the market. In case of competition between retailers,
Fumagalli and Motta (2006) reﬁned the analysis and showed that
the risk of exclusion increases when the intensity of downstream
competition decreases. Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) however
argue that the opposite is true when buyers are allowed to breach
exclusive contracts and pay expectation damages.
LTC also indirectly have exclusionary effects by drying out spot
markets. Spot markets deliver better results than bilateral
contracting only if sufﬁciently liquid. The absence of competitive
spot markets is detrimental to social welfare in several ways. A
competitive spot market allows more transparency than bilateral
contracting on the evolution of supply and demand and the
current production costs of the ﬁrms in place. The possibility to
contract efﬁciently on the spot also limits the opportunity of
dominant agents to abuse their market power when they contract
bilaterally with smaller players. It mitigates as well the risk that in
the long term LTC will lead to tacit collusion on spot markets by
stabilizing the market shares of an oligopoly of collectively
dominant suppliers (DG COMP, 2007; Le Coq, 2004; Liski and
Montero, 2006; Neumann and von Hirschhausen, 2006). However,
Green and Le Coq (2006) suggest that the longer LTC are, the
lesser is the risk that collusion will be sustainable. The lack of a
liquid spot market will not facilitate entry in retail and trading,
and will thus foster volatility which encourages market players
towards vertical re-integration or long-term contracting. Last, we
note that similar exclusionary effects may also arise both from the
ﬁdelity rebates granted by dominant ﬁrms and from unclear
termination rights, which provokes foreclosure effects and higher
switching costs, thereby contradicting the current market build-
ing efforts of the EU.
Some contract clauses other than duration and exclusivity
might also result in anti-competitive effects or express an attempt
at monopolizing the market. Destination clauses and use restric-
tions hamper the integration of a single European market for
energy, facilitate collusion between sellers and decrease competi-
tion intensity in the downstream market (Neuhoff and von
Hirschhausen, 2006). Reduction clauses, the so-called ‘English
clauses’, clauses of ‘right of ﬁrst refusal’ or ‘most favored
customer’ all have similar market partitioning effects. Clauses of
tacit renewal, which typically decrease transaction costs for
individual contracting parties, may easily have lock-in and thus
foreclosure effects when the producer is overwhelmingly domi-
nant.
At last, we note that, although not linked directly to the
duration or exclusivity clauses, LTC might also entail severe price
restraints such as excessive pricing or price discrimination. The
price negotiated in a LTC depends on contracting parties’
information about market conditions as well as on their
respective bargaining power. As a result, an incumbent might
well abuse the position of dependency of a new entrant or unfairly
discriminate in favor of another incumbent. For instance, in case
of regulated tariff in the downstream market associated with an
overwhelmingly dominant producer upstream, a signiﬁcant price
squeeze may lead to severe barriers to entry. To the opposite, price
discount linked to a long duration or a signiﬁcant volume may
distort competition in the downstream market if this rebate gives
a competitive hedge to the downstream dominant ﬁrm.Please cite this article as: Hauteclocque, A.de, Glachant, J.-M., Long
Fuzzy not.... Energy Policy (2009), doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2009.07.0542.4. Conclusion: the EU actual antitrust dilemma with LTC in energy-
quo vadis European Commission?
This section has showed that the antitrust dilemmawith LTC in
energy is far from entirely solved by economic theory. The effect
of LTC on welfare depend on many variables such as the different
risks involved, the evolution of supply and demand, the storability
of the product, market structure and primarily who is signing the
contract. Economics does not provide any integrated model to
weigh anti-competitive effects with potential efﬁciency gains over
several periods of time but clearly shows the different elements to
be taken into account to conduct the balancing exercise. The
above analysis seems to indicate that building markets to increase
welfare in deregulated energy markets might require an asym-
metric application of antitrust policy, at least in the short term.
Indeed, if a new entry may clearly depend on the signing of a LTC,
the claim that potential efﬁciency gains counter-balance anti-
competitive effects is much less clear in the case of super-
dominant incumbents which have already secured a wide
customer base, even for investments in very high ﬁxed-costs
technologies such as nuclear.
A ‘legalistic’ analysis of LTC, especially if a pro-entry bias is
favored, could lead to an analysis primarily based on the form of
contracts and therefore to a general ban on LTC in energy. A more
economic approach, to the opposite, could not rule out the fact
that even dominant ﬁrms beneﬁt from using LTC and that
substantial foreclosure effects may not occur in every case.
However, fully analyzing the pros and cons of all LTC would
result in signiﬁcant enforcement costs. The quality and efﬁciency
of antitrust analysis largely depends on the level of information
required to limit ‘type I’ and ‘type II’ errors in decision making. As
a result, a constant preoccupation of antitrust policy should be to
narrow down the number of cases where a full competition
analysis is required to reach a decision. From that angle, the
‘legalistic’ approach would have the obvious advantage to clarify
rules, both for enforcers and market players, and hence to
facilitate self-enforcement through deterrence.
It is widely believed that the European Commission is taking a
dogmatic approach on LTC and would simply consider them
unacceptable when implemented by dominant companies. This
can be understood as DG Competition since the early 2000s has
publicly and repeatedly voiced strong concerns over the risks of
anti-competitive effects inherent in energy LTC (Albers, 2001–
2002; DG COMP, 2007) without clearly acknowledging their
positive aspects. However, we will argue in the next two sections
that if some uncertainty remains, a methodology of analysis has
emerged at the European Commission and that this methodology
takes into account most of the modern competition economics of
LTC.3. A two-step methodology to analyze the anti-competitive
effects of LTC in deregulated energy markets is emerging
Prior to liberalization, LTC were not a priority of the European
Commission which rather focused on removing legal monopolies
over imports and exports. A few decisions in the early to mid
1990s nonetheless concerned long-term power purchase agree-
ments between independent power producers and the national
incumbents. They mainly aimed at limiting their durations so that
these LTC would not jeopardize the forthcoming opening of
markets. 15 years became the canonical duration accepted by
competition authorities and no structured analysis of foreclosure
effects was conducted. Since then, no clear methodology to
analyze foreclosure effects in the context of deregulated energy
markets has been clearly communicated by competition autho--term energy supply contracts in European competition policy:
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market place (Hauteclocque, 2009). However, since the early
2000s and especially for the last two years, a series of decisions
have been taken concerning the portfolio of LTC of several
incumbents (Repsol, E.ON Ruhrgas, RWE and most importantly
Distrigaz) and new proceedings are regularly opened (EDF,
Electrabel, GDF). We argue that a two-step methodology to
analyze foreclosure of access to customers in the new liberalized
context is emerging from recent decisions and that this metho-
dology is clearly inspired by sound economic principles.3.1. Step one: market share thresholds and ‘black-listed’ contract
clauses—per se prohibitions
Antitrust enforcement is constrained by the rules contained in
the EC Treaty as ﬁrms may appeal against the decisions of the
European Commission before Community Courts. Art 81 EC which
deals with anti-competitive practices and Art 82 EC which tackles
abuses of dominance, together with relevant guidelines, notices
and regulation, do not a priori allow or ban LTC. They provide to
the opposite a framework of analysis based on market share
thresholds deﬁning which situations must be fully investigated.
This system is designed to provide predictability to the ﬁrms and
allow competition authorities to focus their enforcement re-
sources to the most serious infringements. It is thus based on the
fundamental insight that vertical restrictions of competition may
be harmful to competition only when horizontal competition is
distorted. This means that the European Commission will act only
when the LTC is implemented by a company with market power,
market shares being used to approximate the level of dominance.
This is an imperfect proxy for market power in many cases in
energy but as concerns customer foreclosure, market shares seem
a good and easy tool to use. To determine market shares and
eventually ground the ﬁnding of dominance, competition autho-
rities must ﬁrst deﬁne relevant product and geographic markets.
In both electricity and gas, the relevant product market is
wholesale supply, by opposition to retail supply which excludes
very large customers. The difﬁculties in deﬁning the relevant
product market in cases involving LTC have generally been similar
in both industries and mainly reside in the deﬁnition of wholesale
customers. Consumption level is generally the criteria retained
but consumption patterns and demand proﬁles have also been
used. An important issue is indeed whether large industrial
customers (e.g. chemical and steel companies in electricity, CCGT
in gas) and resellers constitute the same product market. Another
issue is whether trading and supply markets should be dis-
sociated, even though the European Commission has always
considered power exchanges and hubs part of wholesale supply.
As concerns the relevant geographic market, the European
Commission has always estimated that relevant markets were
national in scope, or even regional in certain downstream gas
markets, primarily due to the presence of physical and contractual
congestion on interconnectors. Relevant geographic markets may
however be consistently moving in the new market context, for
instance because of the development of regional exchanges and
market coupling initiatives in electricity or a major structural
reduction in long-term reservations of gas import capacity.
In practice, LTC between small and medium-sized companies
are normally not considered by the European Commission as
being capable of affecting appreciably trade between member
states, except when they engage in cross-border trade. In fact, as
long as the market shares of each contracting parties do not
exceed 15%, LTC do not fall under the jurisdiction of the European
Commission. Beyond 15% market shares, LTC are presumed to be
legal so long as the market share threshold of 30% is not exceededPlease cite this article as: Hauteclocque, A.de, Glachant, J.-M., Long
Fuzzy not.... Energy Policy (2009), doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2009.07.054and duration is not indeﬁnite or over 5 years. In case of collective
dominance by several suppliers below the 30% threshold, the
European Commission or a national competition authority retains
the right to conduct a full competition analysis. LTC for companies
with larger market shares will require a full competition analysis
in all cases.
To the system of market share thresholds has been added a list
of black-listed contract clauses, called ‘hard-core’ restraints. These
contract clauses are thought to contravene the fundamental
Treaty objective of market integration and hence will almost
never be accepted, which amounts to a quasi per se prohibition.
Black-listed clauses relevant for energy are essentially market
partitioning clauses, use restrictions and contractual provisions
having similar effects. Forbidding market partitioning clauses and
use restrictions makes sense for a homogenous product and in an
industry that has traditionally been organized along national
borders. During the course of recent decisions in energy, the
European Commission has also made clear that clauses other than
duration and exclusivity leading to signiﬁcant switching costs
would almost never be accepted when implemented by dominant
ﬁrms. Among them, unclear termination rights, ﬁdelity rebates
and tacit renewal clauses have been considered illegal in several
decisions. In these instances, the Commission has clearly favored
the ﬁght against foreclosure over the saving of transaction costs
for individual contracting parties, even to the detriment of the
non-dominant ﬁrms contracting with a dominant incumbent.
The EU law framework to analyze anti-competitive effects of
LTC is thus primarily based on market share thresholds and a
series of black-listed clauses. Even if these thresholds are set
somewhat arbitrarily and have not been designed speciﬁcally for
energy markets, they nevertheless contribute to ensure more
predictability in enforcement. In addition, they rely on the fact
that a ﬁrm with low market shares will not be able to distort
competition sufﬁciently to justify a full competition analysis,
which is justiﬁed from an economic point of view. As concerns the
black listed clauses, it is obvious that the market integration
objective played a big part in their deﬁnition. They however ﬁt
well in energy where the low level of market integration remains
hard to overcome. Over 30% market shares and provided that
certain clauses are not included in the contract, competition
authorities see a ‘grey’ area where the assessment of anti-
competitive effects becomes more complicated and where, in
theory, a multiplicity of elements should be taken into account.
We will show that the emerging methodology of the European
Commission evidences awareness of a lot of the modern
economics of foreclosure.3.2. Step 2: analysis of anti-competitive effects in ‘grey’ cases—the
relevant facts
In case the LTC does not include any hard-core restraints and
the market shares of at least one of the contracting parties exceed
the 30% threshold, the European Commission will conduct a full
competition analysis of the anti-competitive effects of the
agreement to decide if it infringes EC antitrust law. This de facto
limits antitrust enforcement in energy to the cases involving
dominant incumbents. We will see in Section 3 that this is only
when there is a strong presumption that the LTC will result in
substantial anti-competitive effects that the analysis of potential
efﬁciency gains attached to the LTC will be carried out and that a
balancing exercised will be conducted. Long-term contracting by
dominant ﬁrms is therefore far from being illegal per se.
Competition authorities will consider a lot of different
elements to analyze anti-competitive effects. Some are purely
intrinsic to the vertical relationship as the duration or the volume-term energy supply contracts in European competition policy:
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the level of vertical integration in the industry. This is reasonable
in so far as the potential anti-competitive effects of a LTC, or a
portfolio of LTC, cannot be understood without taking into
account the speciﬁcities of the market context. We will thus ﬁrst
analyze how the European Commission assesses market char-
acteristics before going on to its analyses of the contract itself.3.2.1. Analysis of market characteristics
Market characteristics are usually what competition autho-
rities analyze ﬁrst. Economic theory is poor on insights regarding
the patterns of entry in energy markets and the speciﬁc market
features which favor it. In the recent line of decisions, elements
taken into account included the maturity of demand, the level of
vertical integration in the market, the real opportunity to set up a
new resale network and the existence of buyer power. The latter is
important as contracting parties frequently have diverging
interests and thus incentives to contain each other’s market
power. In general, the European Commission considered that the
presence of numerous buyers de facto limits the possibilities of
abuse of a dominant position by the supplier. When assessing
market characteristics, the European Commission also looks at
potential entry in supply and demand, and its potential impact on
future competition. This largely depended on the existence of
potential competitors, usually foreign incumbents present in
neighboring markets. A potential competitor is usually a ﬁrm
able to undertake the required investments to enter the market
within one year following a small but signiﬁcant increase in prices
as well as having a certain brand image and ﬁnancial strength. For
entry in electricity, ready available gas capacities have been
considered an important factor.
The most important element will be the assessment of the
cumulative effect of all the LTC signed by the different producers
on market foreclosure. Indeed, LTC can foreclose markets to new
entrants only to the extent that a substantial part of market
demand is already tied for the long term. The doctrine of
cumulative effect had been devised in a famous series of cases
in the beer and ice-cream sectors and had been one of the
cornerstones of the modernization of EC antitrust policy. As a
general rule, the European Commission considers that a signiﬁ-
cant cumulative foreclosure effect is unlikely to arise if the total
market demand tied in the long term does not exceed 30% of
global demand. In the case of a ‘super-dominant’ incumbent like
in the Distrigaz case, the European Commission considered that no
competition concerns would arise if its portfolio of LTC would
cover less than 20% of the market. In E.ON Ruhrgas, the
Bundeskartellamt estimated that the ﬁrm contributed signiﬁ-
cantly to cumulative foreclosure with 75% market shares in its
supply area, within a national market where 80% of total demand
was supplied in the long term. This demonstrates that when a
ﬁrm is largely dominant, the anti-competitive effects of its
demand tied in the long term arise sooner. In the case of a group
of leading suppliers, the European Commission will look similarly
at the cumulative effects of their LTC but there will be no need to
prove that they lead to tacit collusion to show that signiﬁcant
foreclosure effects occur (Kjolbye, 2007).3.2.2. Analysis of contract characteristics
After having analyzed market conditions and their likely
evolution, the focus will be on the characteristics of both the
LTC itself and the contracting parties. Most prominently, the
European Commission will conduct a combined analysis of
duration, exclusivity and whether buyers who represent alone a
substantial part of total market demand (‘critical customer’Please cite this article as: Hauteclocque, A.de, Glachant, J.-M., Long
Fuzzy not.... Energy Policy (2009), doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2009.07.054concept) are tied for the long term with the dominant supplier,
or the collectively dominant suppliers.
The European Commission will ﬁrst look at the percentage of
the consumer demand tied under the LTC, namely the exclusivity
clause, as it is one of the main sources of foreclosure effect.
Indeed, if a customer must meet all or a big part of its needs with a
particular supplier for a long period of time, he does not constitute
any longer an available outlet for a potential entrant. In Gas
Natural/Endesa in 2000, the Commission reduced the size of the
contract from nearly 100% to 75% of Endesa global purchases as
Endesa was one of the leading electricity producers in Spain and
thus could motivate entry in gas supply in its own right. More
generally, the European Commission is looking here at the degree
of economic dependency of the buyer vis- a-vis the dominant
supplier. The share of the customer’s demand tied is in the
European Commission’s view the best way to demonstrate
dependency and it repeatedly used that proxy. Most importantly,
the analysis of the European Commission is based on quantities
actually received and not on quantities contracted. Indeed, take-
or-pay or ﬂexibility clauses are one of the main reasons why LTC
dry out spot markets. Quantities effectively used are generally not
the same than quantities previously forecasted and without
ﬂexibility mechanisms, buyers would be obliged to trade their
surplus or source their missing quantities from spot markets. LTC
could therefore contribute to the deepening of these markets
while providing a fair level of supply security (Longva, 2008).
Flexibility mechanisms are nevertheless not forbidden per se and
the European Commission conducts its analysis on a case-by-case
basis.
European competition authorities recognize when they ana-
lyze exclusivity that transaction costs may become too high when
negotiating for a small quantity and that it may become
uneconomic for an alternative supplier to provide less than a
certain amount. Recent decisions seem to indicate that it is
considered that 20% of a customer demand is the threshold for
having incentives to enter into a relationship with a second
supplier (E.ON Ruhrgas and RWE). Competition authorities are
thus more reluctant to accept LTC accounting for more than 80% of
a customer demand. Some commentators close to the European
Commission think that foreclosure effects could be found for
contracts amounting as low as 50% of a customer demand in case
these contract terms are widely spread in the market (Nyssens
and Schnichels, 2007).
The share of the customer’s demand tied has to be analyzed
along with the duration of the contract. Even if 100% of a customer
demand is tied to a particular supplier, foreclosure will not occur
if this customer can return to the market on a regular basis. As a
general rule, the European Commission is very suspicious of
contracts longer than 5 years and considers that efﬁciencies
generally do not offset foreclosure effects beyond that limit. We
also note that competition authorities consider contracts with
tacit renewal clauses or no last delivery date as contracts of
indeﬁnite duration (E.ON Ruhrgas). Recent decisions show that the
duration of contracts accepted by the European Commission will
mainly depend on the competition position of the counterparty. If
the counterparty is an established reseller, accepted duration will
probably not exceed two years as in Distrigaz. The Bundeskartel-
lamt in E.ON Ruhrgas restricted duration to four years for contracts
with resellers who have more than 50% of their demand tied
under the contract, but only two years above 80%. European
competition authorities will thus play with the two factors.
Interestingly, where requirements are satisﬁed by several suppli-
ers, the Bundeskartellamt speciﬁed that contracts should dis-
tribute the risk of demand ﬂuctuations among suppliers according
to the actual supply share provided by each of them so as not to
disadvantage the smallest suppliers. In Repsol, 5 years duration-term energy supply contracts in European competition policy:
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the market shares of the dominant ﬁrm only reached 30–50%,
which shows that the European Commission adjusts duration
according to the level of market dominance. For a new entrant in
retail, duration of 5 years is most likely to be accepted. One also
notices a more lenient approach of the European Commission
towards fuel supply contracts than to electricity producer/reseller
contracts.4. Balancing anti-competitive effects with efﬁciency gains and
imposing remedies: the ‘more economic’ approach in EC
antitrust policy and the ‘pro-entry’ strategy of the European
Commission in energy
Once the European Commission has considered that a LTC, or a
portfolio of LTC, is likely to create signiﬁcant anti-competitive
effects, it will analyze the potential efﬁciency gains and proceeds
to a balancing exercise. In case efﬁciency gains do not seem to
clearly offset anti-competitive effects, LTC might still be accepted
if satisfactory remedies can be imposed.
4.1. LTC, efﬁciency gains and the practice of the balancing exercise
The balancing exercise follows a methodology based on four
criteria directly derived from the wording of the EC Treaty. In
theory, for LTC with substantial anti-competitive effects to be
cleared by competition authorities, they should (i) substantially
improve economic efﬁciency, (ii) give a fair share of beneﬁts to
ﬁnal consumers, (iii) be indispensable or at least proportional to
the achievement of the efﬁciency gains and (iv) not afford
contracting parties the possibility of eliminating competition in
respect of a substantial part of the products in question. Objective
factors out of the control of the company such as public service
obligations may also be taken into account. In practice, we note
that it is often difﬁcult to trace back elements of competition
authorities’ decisions precisely to the four criteria.
The ﬁrst criterion indicates that the LTC must create signiﬁcant
efﬁciency gains to be accepted. Recent decisions are however less
clear on how to analyze efﬁciency gains than on how to assess
anti-competitive effects. The outcome of the balancing will thus
be even harder to predict. The two main efﬁciency gains
recognized by the European Commission have been investment
and entry. In Synergen for instance, the Commission accepted both
a 15 years gas supply contract with Statoil for 100% of the needs of
the new CCGT and a 15 years power purchase agreement for 50%
of its output with the electricity incumbent ESB. It thus
recognized the need of secure output levels and long-term
upstream fuel commitments to facilitate investments and project
ﬁnancing. However, the mere objective of securing loans might
not be sufﬁcient to have a LTC accepted as the European
Commission in other sectors did not always consider it indis-
pensable. In case the loan comes from a dominant supplier, it is
likely to be considered as an efﬁciency gain only if it cannot be
obtained on the same terms with commercial or investment
banks. It is also noticeable that the European Commission has
once acknowledged that even dominant ﬁrms could claim for a
certain level of security in fuel supply (Gas Natural/Endesa). The
second criterion does not seem to have led to very substantial
developments and in general was analyzed along with the ﬁrst
criterion on efﬁciency gains. As a general rule, the Commission
considered that LTC helping investment and entry contributed to
the success of the liberalization process, which was in itself
thought to be good for ﬁnal consumers.
The third (proportionality) and fourth (exclusion) criteria are
obviously very difﬁcult to implement and this is where thePlease cite this article as: Hauteclocque, A.de, Glachant, J.-M., Long
Fuzzy not.... Energy Policy (2009), doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2009.07.054discretion as well as the difﬁculties of antitrust authorities really
lie. European competition authorities are still struggling with
them today. For instance, an open question concerns the duration
that an incumbent electricity producer really needs to sink a very
high ﬁxed-cost investment (criterion 3) and how to make sure
that this duration will not result in excessive exclusionary effects
(criterion 4). A ﬁrst indicationwas however given by the European
Commission in the Exeltium case in September 2008. Exeltium
was a consortium of energy intensive users to whom EDF was to
supply base load electricity over more than 20 years. Alleged
efﬁciency gains mainly included security of fuel supply and
hedging for the buyers. The European Commission ﬁnally cleared
this contract, after almost three years of analysis, provided that
resale restrictions would be cancelled and an opt-out clause
would be introduced to mitigate anti-competitive effects. In
addition, the European Commission explicitly stated that the
Exeltium agreement would be included in the analysis of the
cumulative foreclosure effect of the contract portfolio of EDF
currently being conducted.
Interestingly, one of the main advantage attached to LTC
recently discussed in the economic literature, which is the
potential mitigation effect of LTC on spot market abuses, has
never been used by the European Commission. This probably
reﬂects the fact that such economic analysis based on oligopoly
modeling would not reach the legal standard of proof required
before the court.4.2. Market building through antitrust remedies: the new treatment
of incumbents
In case efﬁciency gains do not seem to clearly offset anti-
competitive effects during the balancing exercise, LTC might still
be accepted if satisfactory remedies can be imposed.
A ﬁrst group of remedies has consisted in modifying the
drafting of contracts, for instance by deleting certain clauses such
as use restrictions or limiting duration. In this case, the whole
agreement is not cancelled and it belongs to the parties to decide
whether the contract is still valid. Other more behavioral remedies
have been imposed such as forbidding any vertical mergers or
acquisitions for a certain number of years (Repsol). These are
classical remedies in EC antitrust policy and are not speciﬁc to the
energy sector. One notes here that if long-term generation
adequacy is clearly a core policy goal of the European Commission,
the vague concept of ‘security of supply’ is itself approached with
more and more skepticism in antitrust cases. Today, even long-
term gas import contracts are not sure to be accepted on the basis
of a ‘security of supply’ argument, even though the series of cases
involving dominant exporters evidenced the importance of
international politics (Talus, 2007). From an economic point of
view, the fact that the dominant supplier resides outside the EU
does not change the potentially severe anti-competitive effects of
LTC which can similarly be used to foreclose national markets.
However, the antitrust practice of the European Commission on
the long-term import gas contracts of Gazprom or Sonatrach with
European ﬁrms has generally been more inﬂuenced by political
considerations involving security of supply than by sound
economic principles. The European Commission has indeed
compromised the enforcement of EC competition law and limited
its action to the deletion of ‘black-listed’ destination clauses, to
the exclusion of any analysis of foreclosure effects. Longer
durations (up to 25 years) were also accepted. We note that this
status of exception was already accepted in the second gas
Directive (2003/55/EC, Recital 25).
The second group of remedies has been speciﬁcally devised for
the energy sector and coincided with the decision of the European-term energy supply contracts in European competition policy:
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EC) to attack directly the portfolios of LTC of the incumbents. This
was thought to be the only way to bring about rapidly substantial
improvements in the competitive structure. The European
Commission recognized that some of these LTC created real
efﬁciency gains (criterion 1) but that the criterion on exclusion
and proportionality could only be fulﬁlled if foreclosure effects
were severely mitigated. This led the Commission to impose
remedies better able to accommodate market players’ needs while
limiting foreclosure.
The Distrigaz decision constitutes according to the European
Commission the landmark case for future antitrust enforcement
on LTC in energy. The European Commission opened a proceeding
against the Belgian gas incumbent for possible breaches of the EC
Treaty rules on abuse of a dominant position due to their LTC with
industrial customers. The European Commission started by
excluding of the analysis of cumulative foreclosure effects all
the LTC linked to a new investment in gas-ﬁred power plants, in
line with its analysis of efﬁciency gains. A strict limitation of 5
years was then imposed on remaining contracts to avoid that
customers who would be particularly likely to switch suppliers be
tied for a very long period of time and unilateral termination
rights were granted to buyers with contracts longer than 5 years.
A speciﬁc limitation to two years was imposed for contracts with
resellers. The innovation lied in the ﬂexibility parameters granted
to the dominant ﬁrm. Distrigaz was allowed to adjust its portfolio
of contracts to its own needs as long as it complied with contract
durations of maximum 5 years and if 70% of its customers came
back to the market every year. As a result, Distrigaz could
indifferently have 37.5% of customers supplied under 5 year
contracts and 62.5% supplied under one year contracts or 40%
supplied under 4 year contracts and 60% supplied under one year
contracts. These commitments were to last for a minimum of four
years and until Distrigaz’ market shares decrease below 40% (or
another supplier reaches the level of Distrigaz market shares
minus 20%).
4.3. Conclusion: European LTC in competition policy—the European
Commission is doing good, thank you
The analysis of the recent series of decisions shows that the
European Commission is using an economic approach to analyze
foreclosure effects of LTC and imposing remedies in energy. Its
combined analysis of duration, exclusivity and the pattern of
consumption are particularly interesting. Even if the multiple-step
methodology has not been devised for the speciﬁcities of newly
deregulated energy markets, we have to conclude that this
methodology balances favorably between the need for predict-
ability and the need for a full competition analysis in complicated
cases. True, the hierarchy among elements to be taken into
account during the balancing exercise lacks of clarity and hence
predictability. In addition, it is obvious that the analytical
framework used and the remedies imposed are designed so as
to be accepted by Community Courts in case of appeal. We can
nonetheless already have a ﬁrst picture of the emerging doctrine
of European competition authorities on energy LTC.5. Conclusion
The case of energy LTC is highly topical in the European Union.
This paper has shown that the European Commission is much less
dogmatic than is usually thought. Its analysis displays real efforts
to both include recent insights of the competition analysis of
foreclosure and limit regulation costs through a step-based
approach. Even dominant incumbents are granted the right toPlease cite this article as: Hauteclocque, A.de, Glachant, J.-M., Long
Fuzzy not.... Energy Policy (2009), doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2009.07.054sign LTC and the remedies imposed here and there have been
innovative. However, the European Commission still takes a
‘legalistic’ approach in so far as its practice closely complies with
what could be acceptable before the European Courts of Justice. In
addition this new approach has not been devised for the speciﬁc
context of energy market building and there is no reason to
believe that the thresholds successfully used for beer and ice-
cream are inevitably smart for energy. The market building efforts
of the European Commission under its antitrust powers thus
appear to be constrained by the procedural aspects of the legal
process.
In addition, by building markets through antitrust, the
European Commission necessarily focuses on market structure
rather than on market design. This is a risky choice as our
knowledge of competition dynamics in these sectors is too limited
to propose very robust and efﬁcient remedies. We must also note
that building market through antitrust is far from being limited to
the ex post tool kit. Antitrust has become a constantly on-going
process of ‘trial-and-error’ which clariﬁes rules over time. Each
rule being incrementally clariﬁed then increases the credibility of
self-enforcing competitive behaviors in the market.References
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